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Recent studies have consistently shown that the East-Asian crisis-stricken countries 
have suffered from different degrees of credit crunch, particularly during the early 
stages of the crisis. However, only few of them have looked closely into the 
breakdowns of the loans and the roles of different groups of banks in explaining the 
rise and fall of bank lending, particularly to the small businesses during the post-1997 
financial crisis. This paper aims to fill this void by looking at closely the recent 
development in Indonesia. 
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Recent studies have consistently shown that the East-Asian crisis-stricken 
countries have suffered from different degrees of credit crunch, particularly during the 
early stages of the crisis.
1 Reversals of international capital movement, 
unprecedented exchange rate devaluations, tight monetary conditions (reflected by 
high key domestic interest rates), flights to quality (shifting of assets toward less risky 
ones such as government securities) and impositions of higher and stricter capital 
adequacy ratios have frequently been listed as some of the key determinants of a 
credit crunch.
2  
However, hardly any of these recent studies have looked closely into the 
breakdowns of the loans and the roles of different groups of banks in explaining the 
rise and fall of the bank lending in any of these East Asian crisis-effected economies 
during the post-1997 crisis. Only few studies have also been done to evaluate the 
availability of credit to the small businesses during the recent credit crunch in East 
Asia.
3  As small enterprises form an essential pillar to the economies, the knowledge 
on how different factors or policy measures affect the supply of small business loans 
will inarguably be very valuable for the policy makers of these Asian countries.  
This paper aims to fill this void by looking at closely the recent development in 
Indonesia as a study case. We have evidence that the resurgence of bank credits in 
this most-populated country in East Asia during the post-1997 crisis has, in fact, not 
been felt by all sectors of the economy. In particular, we want to show that the growth 
                                                 
1    Refer to Agenor, Aizenman and Hoffmaister (2000), Borensztein and Lee (2002), Ding, 
Domac and Ferri (1998), Agung et.al (2001), Bank Indonesia (2000) and Ghosh and Ghosh 
(1999), Fane and McLeod (2002)). 
2     In addition to those studies listed in footnote #1, some of these aspects have been fully 
addressed by various studies such as Bernanke and Low (1992), Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1996), Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) and Mishkin (1991). Refer to  
(http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/acad_res/studies_banking_crisis.html) for more 
relevant studies. 
3    Hancock and Wilcox (1998) have looked at the implication of the credit crunch on the 
availability of credit to small business in the United States from 1989 to 1992. Borensztein 
and Lee (2002) review the presence of credit crunch at the firm levels in Korea during the 
1997 financial crisis. Patten, et..al  (2001) looks at various loans (including microfinance and 
small business loans) by one key state bank (the Bank Rakyat Indonesia) in Indonesia during 
the recent East Asian crisis.  
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rates of nominal and real loans to small businesses in particular have remained 
unstable and failed to keep up with the growths of the loans to the rest of the 
economy (Figure 1a and 1b)
4. This is despite the fact that the small industry has 
been the most vibrant sector of the Indonesian economy during the peak- and the 
post-1997 financial crisis (Table 1).
5   
As in any developing and developed nations, this industry in Indonesia relies 
heavily on the banking sector for its working capital.
6 During the pre-1997 crisis, the 
private and state banks contributed almost equal shares to their total of around 90 
percent of the small enterprise credit outstanding by the banking sector (Figure 2).
7  
In addition, there have always been strong and positive correlations between the 
monthly growth rates of small loans and that of the total outstanding credit for both 
groups of banks during the pre-crisis.  
Yet, despite the return of much-needed annual growths of outstanding credits 
by both groups of banks, their shares of the small loans experienced few opposing 
trends since the beginning of the crisis (Figures 2 and 3)).  While the quarterly 
average of credit outstanding to the small enterprises by the state banks increased 
by about 8 percent in 2001 from its level in 1997, the quarterly average of small 
enterprise loans by the private national bank severely dropped by over 50 percent for 
the same period.  The substantial decline in the supply of loans by the domestic 
                                                 
4    Real loans are nominal loans adjusted by the price level (the consumer price index). 
5    According to the Small Business Law of the Republic of Indonesia number 9/1995, small 
businesses cannot have assets (exclusive of building and land) of more than 200 million 
rupiah and sales of more than one billion rupiah. This enterprise must be owned by an 
Indonesian citizen, and standing on its own, not part of a business affiliation or business 
branch owned or dominated or having affiliation directly with medium and big businesses. 
With the collapses of domestic conglomerates and large corporations in 1998 and 1999 (the 
two worst years of the 1997 financial crisis), the contributions of the small business sector in 
the economy of Indonesia increased steadily, reaching its highest at 43 percent of the total 
gross domestic products in 1999 (Table 1). More importantly, in average around 90 percent of 
the annual total employment and entrepreneurs were associated with the small businesses 
between 1997-2001. 
6     Refer to Samolyk (1997); Brewer et.al (1996); Mishkin (1995); Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) ; Huang (2003); and Pangestu and Habir (2002). 
7     As for the rest, the regional development bank supplies the majority share. The 
contribution of the foreign private banks is very insignificant ---less than one percent of the 
annual average of the total outstanding credits to the small enterprises in the last 10 years.  
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private banks has contributed to the reported 13 percent drop in the quarterly 
average of total outstanding small loans by the banking sector in 2001 from its level 
in 1997.
8  Between 2001 and 2002, small loans from both groups of banks 
experienced steady declines, albeit the drop in the state bank loans was more 
moderate.
9  
What has been the underlying factors generating these periodically 
contrasting trends in the supply of loans by the two major groups of banks? What 
were the causes of the overall drops in the small business loans in late 2001 and 
2002?  Timberg (1999) and Musa (1998) reveal that small firms have other non-
banking financial resources.
 The availability of the non-banking sources of fund for 
the small-scale firms certainly could reduce their dependence on the banking sector. 
It does not however adequately explain the sharp fall of the percentage loans to the 
small firms by the private banks in one hand, and the significantly much stronger flow 
of loans to the small enterprises by the state banks on the other (Figure 2 and 3). 
Undoubtedly, to answer these questions, it is imperative that we look into the 
demand side of the loans. But, the lack of readily available relevant data on small 
firms precludes us from evaluating the demand for the small business loans.
10  
Based on the findings of previous studies on the overall bank loans in Indonesia and 
the strong performance of the small businesses during the crisis, one can however 
                                                 
8     Moreover, despite the sharp falls during the first six months of the crisis, the quarterly 
average share of the state bank outstanding small business loans was still at a respectable 
rate of around 27 percent from 2000 to 2001, roughly four percentage points higher than its 
highest pre-crisis average, reported from quarter 1, 1996 to quarter 1, 1997 (Figure 3). In 
contrast, with the exception for the last six months of 2000, the quarterly average share of 
small enterprise credits by the private banks during the crisis period has been substantially 
below the level reported during the last two years of the pre-crisis period.  
9     The reported shares of the small business loans by the private banks for the second 
quarter of 2001 onward had hovered back to the lowest levels of the crisis period (at the first 
two quarters of 1999). Conversely, the small loan share by the state banks at the first quarter 
of 2002 was still about the same level reported during the pre-crisis period of first quarter of 
1997.  
10     Timberg (1999) has also acknowledged the limited availability of data on the small and 
medium enterprises.   
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argue that the source of the drop in the small-scale loans would likely to come from 
the supply side.
11 
One supply side phenomena that will obviously be worth mentioning is the 
impact of the closure of several insolvent banks at the early stage of the 1997 
financial crisis on the loans to small firms. To our knowledge, no study has looked 
into this particular issue. This factor has undoubtedly contributed to the fall in the 
actual total nominal and real value of outstanding bank loans to the small firms, 
especially in 1998-1999 (Figure 1a and 1b). But it is also inadequate in explaining the 
ups and downs of the percentage share of the small enterprise loans by the existing 
private banks (Figure 3).   
Agung et.al (2001), Bank Indonesia (2000), Ghosh and Ghosh (1999), Azis 
and Thorbecke (2002), and Siregar (2003), have found that fluctuations of key 
domestic interest rates have largely been responsible for the sharp drops in the 
overall bank lending during the early and worst stages of the crisis in Indonesia. In 
particular, these studies have shown that a rise in key domestic interest rates 
exacerbated and provoked a large decrease in lending, consistent with the overall 
conclusions of Mankiw (1986) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993).  
Supporting the findings of those early studies, Figures 1a, 1b, 4 and 5 show 
convincingly that the return of more conducive interest rate structures in the banking 
sector, reflected by the positive interest spreads (particularly between the lending 
rate and the deposit rate; and between the lending rate and the rate of the certificate 
of Bank Indonesia (SBI)) in early 1999, was followed by the onset of relatively robust 
positive growth rates of total credit outstanding by the banking sector starting late 
1999. 
12 The small business credits have, however, continued to stagnate or even 
                                                 
11     Early studies have consistently confirmed that the growths of credit have been largely 
explained by the supply-side factors (Agung et.al (2001), Bank Indonesia (2000) and Ghosh 
and Ghosh (1999)). 
 
12     The certificate of Bank Indonesia is the key monetary policy instrument that the central 
bank employs to conduct its open market operations.  
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experienced negative quarterly growth rates, particularly since the first quarter of 
2000.  
To generate a better account of the driving forces behind the fluctuations in  
the small enterprise lending, we consider a “third factor”: the Bank Indonesia Policy 
of January 2001 which has effectively abolished a stringent condition whereby each 
public bank (state and private) must allocate at least 20 percent of their total credit 
outstanding for the small enterprise loans.
13  
In this paper, a profit maximization model is constructed to explicitly show the 
potential roles of the three monetary policy related variables (the two interest rate 
spreads and the mandatory credit allocation) in explaining the fluctuations of the 
small business loans by the state and private banks. We then empirically evaluate 
the significance of those three explanatory factors in explaining the quarterly 
percentage share of the small business loans in the total outstanding credits of: a) 
private and state banks combined; b) private banks only; and c) state banks only 
during the pre- and post-1997 financial crisis.   
By way of preview, we find the three listed factors influenced significantly the 
shares of loans to the small enterprises by these two groups of banks. In general, the 
results confirmed the adverse implication of the tight monetary policy and also the 
flight to quality phenomena (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)). Interestingly, the 
result for the state bank seems to suggest that this group of bank was able to 
continue expanding its share of small loans despite the negative spread between the 
lending rate and the deposit rate at the peak of the 1997 financial crisis. The share of 
the small loans by the private bank, on the other hand, had been adversely affected 
by the negative spreads. These contrasting findings partly explain the rise (and fall) 
in the share of the small loans by the state (and private bank) from 1997 to 2000. 
Furthermore, they also seem to suggest that the basic assumption of profit-
                                                 
13    Bank Indonesia Policy No.3/2/PBI/2001. Under this latest regulation, Small enterprise 
loans are those credits up to 500 million rupiah.  
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maximization behaviour is only applicable for the private banks, not for the state 
banks.  
As for the post 2001 period, the abolishment of the mandatory credit 
allocation to the small businesses has largely been responsible for the declines in the 
small loan shares by these two groups of banks. The impact of this policy measure, 
has, however, affected the private bank small loans more severely than those of the 
state banks. Due to their focus only on total loans by the banking sector, early 
studies fail to capture all of these critical contrasting results. 
The next section of the paper will briefly review a number of stylised facts on 
the three potential determinants of the supply of bank credits to the small enterprises. 
In section 3, we introduce a theoretical framework that captures a number of possible 
relationships between the supply of credits and its key determinants.  The empirical 
section conducts two sets of unit-root tests (the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the 
Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock (BLS) rolling test). Based on the unit-root properties 
of the series, both the Johansen cointegration tests and the autoregressive 
distributed lagged (ARDL) error correction model test for the long-run and short-run 
analysis are conducted. Section 5 of the paper presents further policy analyses 
based on the test results. A brief concluding remark section ends the paper.  
 
2.  Brief Reviews of Trends and Stylised Facts  
2.1  Interest Rate Spreads 
2.1.2  The Lending and SBI Spreads 
One of the extensive debates that have taken placed in Indonesia at the initial 
and worst stages of the 1997 financial crisis was on the desirability of rising key 
interest rates to defend the local currency and to manage the growth rate of the base 
money.
14 At its highest level reported in August 1998, the one-month central bank 
security (1-month SBI rate) rate went beyond 70 percent. During the peak period of 
                                                 
14    Johnston (1998).  
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the crisis (1998 and 1999), the interest returns of one-month SBI was in fact 
significantly higher than the lending rate, by an average of more than 20 percent for 
the private national banks and 30 percent for the state banks (Figure 4).   
Between June 1999 and April 2000, the one-month rate of the central bank 
security reported a steady decline and reached its lowest rate at around 11 percent in 
April 2000. However, the rate has reverted back to a rising trend since June 2000. In 
the last 6 months of 2001, the one-month SBI rate reached an average level of well 
above 17 percent. In early June 2003, the SBI rates have hovered back to levels 
between 10 to 11 percent. 
 
  2.1.1  The Lending and Deposit Spreads 
  The combination of the high inflationary pressures and the tight monetary 
policy to defend the local currency particularly at the first two years of the crisis 
pushed the deposit rate to increase proportionally to ensure the real interest rate to 
be marginally above zero. The lending/ working capital rate, on the other hand, could 
not rise as much to prevent further defaults on the loans. Subsequently, as the 
deposit rate exceeded the lending rate in the early 1998, the domestic banking sector 
in Indonesia experienced a costly period of negative-interest rate spreads (Figure 5). 
From January 1998 to December 1998, the six-month deposit rate was in average 
around 7 percent higher than the lending rate. In October 1998, the negative spread 
was at a staggering rate of 19 percent. The negative spread continued during the first 
seven months of 1999, with the average spread rate at 2.2 percent. Only starting the 
second half of 1999 that the spread of lending and deposit rates returned to positive 
levels. 
2.2.  Central Bank Policy of January 2001 
  For about three decades prior to the 1997 financial crisis, Bank Indonesia had 
to coordinate both roles of being the monetary policy maker and the agent of 
development. Under the Act of Bank Indonesia, No. 13/1968, Bank Indonesia directly  
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involved in formulating credit policy to small enterprises, providing direct capital 
assistance and also technical assistance. In its January 1990 policy package, the 
central bank imposed a mandatory requirement for the commercial banks (state and 
private) to allocate 20 percent of their total outstanding loans to small-scale 
businesses.   
To push further the reform in the banking sector and the independence of the 
central bank as targeted by the Central Bank Law no.23/1999, the Letter of Intents 
(LOIs) between IMF and the government of Indonesia signed in January 2000 
stipulates a future plan to phase out mandatory requirements on the commercial 
banks lending to SMEs.
15 Following through with its commitment, Bank Indonesia 
issued its regulation in January 2001 which officially abolished any requirement for 
commercial banks (state and private) to place at least around 20 percent of its total 
credit outstanding to the small enterprises.
16 It is important to note here however that 
the central bank remains active in providing funding and technical supports to the 
small businesses through the two state banks (BRI and BTN) and a newly 
established institution (PT PMN).
17  
 
3.  Basic Theoretical Framework 
The objective of this section is to introduce a theoretical framework that 
incorporates three key potential determinants of the supply of bank loans to the small 
enterprises. In a competitive model, banks are expected to maximize their profits at 
each period  ). (Π  We acknowledge that the basic underlying assumption of 
competitive and profit maximization institution may not be necessarily fully applicable 
to our groups of banks. In particular, the state banks in Indonesia are often involved 
                                                 
15    This Letter of Intents can be downloaded from 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2000/idn/01/index.htm.  
16     Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 3/2/PBI/2001. 
17    These commitments of Bank Indonesia were emphasized also by one of the Deputy 
Governors of Bank Indonesia, Maulana Ibrahim (BISNIS INDONESIA (a daily local 
Newspaper), June 17, 2001).  For more insights to the operations of the BRI (Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia), refer to Patten, et.al (2001).   
 
11
in activities that may not necessarily be profitable, such as financing poorly 
performed state owned enterprises and various government policies. To keep the 
model simple and to focus on objectives stated in the introduction, our model will 
mainly incorporate the three possible determinants of the supply of bank loans (the 
interest spreads and the mandatory credit allocation). As will be elaborated in the 
empirical section, the testing results on these three determinants are able to capture 
evidences of non-profit maximizing characteristics of the state banks.  
Banks absorb deposit from the local economy, and they hold two forms of 
assets: loans (small enterprise loans  ) (
s L  and medium and large enterprise loans 
) (
ml L ), and central bank securities  ) (CBS .
18  Total loans can be expressed as 
(
ml s L L L + = ). As price takers, each bank takes as given the rate of loans  ) ( L r , the 
rate of deposits  ) ( D r , and the rate of central bank securities  ) ( G r . Note here, the 
loan rates for small and medium to large enterprises for each group of the banks in 
Indonesia are relatively the same and equal to  ) ( L r . Hence, the choice between 
extending the loans to the small or the medium-large enterprises will depend on the 
cost associated with each type of loans.   
We assume that the only source of fund to be channelled into lending, 
reserve, and government security is the deposit that they absorb from the public.  
Deposit (D) = loans (L) + reserve (R)  + central bank securities (CBS). Banks must 
keep a ) (res percentage of its deposit in its reserve, and will extend a  ) (l percentage 
of its deposit as loans. Hence;  D res R . = ,  D l L . = , and  . ] ). 1 [( L D res CBS − − =   
The total cost of the bank  )) , , ( ( D CBS L C covers all the expenses associated 
with the management and the risks/uncertainties of its assets (the costs of small 
enterprise loans )) ( (
s L C plus the cost of the medium and large enterprises loans 
                                                 
18    Since we are not interested on looking at the loans to medium and large enterprises in 




ml L C ; the government securities  )) ( ( CBS C ); and its liabilities ( ) (D C ). 
Incorporating all of the key factors, we can express the profit function of the bank 
as:
19 
   
) , , ( ) ( ) ( D CBS L C r D r CBS L r D G L − − + = Π      (1) 
 
As discussed, prior to January 2001, the central bank of Indonesia requires the 
private commercial banks to channel a percentage of their total loans  ) (gg  to the 
small enterprises. Failure to meet the set share will result in a penalty. On the other 
hand, if the bank successfully extends a ) (ga percentage of its total loans to small 
enterprises, where  ) ( gg ga > , the bank will receive a reward from the central bank. 
We can express the cost (reward) of not following (adopting) the credit mandatory 








, that is as the realized total supply of small loans  ) . ( L ga increases, the 
penalty cost will decline. 
Adding the “policy cost function”  (.)) (CP and expressing deposit  ) (D  as 
) ( CBS RES L + +  and government security (CBS) as 
L CBS RES L res CBS − + + − = )] ).( 1 [( , the profit equation (Equation 1) can be 
further modified as follow (Equation 2): 
 
) ) (( ) , , ( ) ( ] ) )( 1 [( L ga gg CP D CBS L C r CBS RES L r L CBS RES L res L r D G L − − − + + − − + + − + = Π
   
 
3.1  Interest Spreads and Small Enterprise Loans 
                                                 
19    For a comprehensive analysis on the economic theory of banking, refer to Freixas and 
Rochet (1997).  
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  To generate the profit-maximizing amount of loans that the bank should 
supply to the small enterprises, the first order condition (F.O.C) of the profit function 
with respect to (
s L ) is derived: 
 




r r res r r res
L
(.) (.)
) ( ) ( 1 0 − − − + − − = =
∂
Π ∂
    (3) 
Note:  ; 1 0 < < res  and . 0 ) 1 ( > − res  
 
The F.O.C denotes that a competitive bank will adjust its volume of small business 
loans in such a way that the corresponding marginal 
revenue() ( ) [] G L D L r r res r r res − + − − ) ( ) ( 1  equals to the marginal management cost of 
the loan to the small enterprises [
s dL
dCost




We can derive the analyses on the two interest rate spreads and supply of 
loans from Equation (3). 
a). A rise in the spread between the lending rate ( L r ) and the deposit rate 
) ( D r  entails an increase in the supply of loans.  
b). A rise in the spread between the lending rate ( L r ) and the government 
security rate  ) ( G r  is going to increase the supply of loans.  
 
3.2  Mandatory Credit Allocation and Supply of Small Enterprise Loans  
Next, we need to derive the implication of mandatory credit policy on the 
supply of small business loans. To do so, we need to carry out a comparative 
analysis between the F.O.C of the profit function with the credit policy (Equation 3) 













r r res r r res
L
(.)
) ( 1 0 − − − − − = =
∂
Π ∂
          (4) 
 





 (i.e. an increase in the supply of small loans should reduce 
(increase) the penalty (reward) that the bank will receive), we can argue for the 
following. 
 
(i).   For the case with credit policy: 
() ( ) [] 0
(.) (.)




r r res r r res      (5) 
The marginal revenue minus the marginal cost of management is negative.  
 
(ii).   For the case without credit policy: 
() ( ) [] 0
(.)
) ( 1 = − − − − − s G L D L dL
dCost
r r res r r res     ( 6 )  
The marginal revenue minus the marginal cost of management equals to zero. 
Given the standard assumption of diminishing marginal profit, Equations (5 
and 6) imply that the supply of small loans with the presence of “credit policy” is 
larger than the level without the policy. In another word, the enforcement (the 
abolishment) of the credit mandatory policy will lead to a larger (smaller) amount of 
loans to the small enterprises by the commercial banks.  
4. Empirics 
4.1  Working Model and Data
20 
Based on the theoretical framework in section 2, the following regression of 
the semi-log equation will be tested: 
 
                                                 
20    The author wishes to thank Saut Simanjuntak of Bank Indonesia for providing most of the 
key data series for this section of the paper.  
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t t t it G L it D L
s
it crisis gg r r r r PL ε β β β β β + + + − + − + = 4 3 2 1 0 ) ( ) (    (7) 
 
The crisis dummy variable  ( t crisis ) is added to capture the changes in the overall 
domestic economic condition due to the 1997 financial crisis in Indonesia.  ) ( 0 β and 
( t ε  ) are the constant parameter and the error term, respectively.  ) (t denotes the 
time, and  ) (i  represents the three groups of small credit share for: state and private 
banks combined; state bank only; and private bank only. The test will cover the 
period from quarter 1, 1993 to quarter 2, 2002. The availability of quarterly series on 
the loans to small enterprises dictates our choice of testing period. 
 (
s
it PL ) are the percentage shares of loans allocated to the small enterprises 
at time (t)  by both state and private banks combined and by each group of banks 
individually. The data are sourced from the Bank Indonesia Data Base. Variable 
s
it PL  are in the log-forms. 
it D L r r ) ( −  is the spread between the lending and the deposit rate at time t.
 21 
The lending rates for the private and the state banks are the average working capital 
for 12 months offered by each group of banks. The deposit rates are the average of 
the annual 3, 6 and 12 months time deposit rates for both the state and the private 
banks. The data sets are taken from the Bank of Indonesia Data Base. As for the 
case of the total small enterprise loans of the private and state banks combined, we 



























= −    (8) 
 
                                                 
21    Given the negative interest spreads for some periods, the log-forms of the variables 
cannot be calculated.  
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Where:  ) (priv and  ) (stat  are the total credit outstanding to the small enterprise by 
the private and state banks, respectively. 
P
t D L r r ) ( − and 
S
t D L r r ) ( − are the lending 
and deposit spread rates for private and state banks, respectively. From the 
theoretical framework (section 2), we therefore expect that ) 0 ( 1 > β .    
it G L r r ) ( −  represents the spread between the interest returns of the loan and 
that of the central bank security at time t.
22  The rate of central bank security is the 
average of 1 month and 3 month Bank Indonesia Security (SBI) rate. Both of these 
series are adopted from the Bank of Indonesia Data Base.  2 β is expected to be 
positive. For the case of private and state banks combined, we construct the 



























= −    (9) 
 
The definitions of  ) (priv and  ) (stat  are the same as before. 
P
t G L r r ) ( − and 
S
t G L r r ) ( − are the lending and SBI spread rates for private and state banks, 
respectively. 
( t gg ) represents the mandatory small business credit allocation policy 
imposed by the central bank on the domestic commercial banks. To capture this 
change in policy, we introduce a dummy variable for (gg ) where it is equal to one 
prior to quarter 1, 2001 and equal to zero otherwise. Based on our theoretical 
analysis,  3 β  is positive. 
 ( t crisis ) is the dummy variable. It is equal to zero for quarter 1, 1993 to 
quarter 1, 1997, and equal to one, otherwise. Given the political uncertainty and the 
                                                 
22      See footnote #12.  
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fragility of economic recovery in the country, we can confidently argue that the 
impacts of the 1997 financial crisis continue to be felt in 2003. Higher investment 
risks are expected during the crisis period, and will therefore likely to deter any 
expansion of the supply of loans into the economy. We therefore expect  4 β  to be 
negative.   
 
4.2 Test  Results 
  We perform three sequential sets of testing: a) the unit root test; b) the 
Johansen cointegration test; and c) the autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL) error 
correction model test. This sub-section will focus mainly on highlighting key empirical 
findings. As for further “interpretations” and policy related analysis, section 5 of the 
paper will cover them. 
 
4.2.1 The Unit Root Tests 
  The commonly used Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) testing is first carried 
out. The results confirm that all relevant series are stationary at first differenced ---
Integrated of Order (1), except for variable t G L r r ) ( − of the private bank, an I(0) series 
(Table 2).  However, given the potential presence of structural breaks associated with 
the 1997 financial crisis, the low power of the ADF test may not be sufficiently 
sensitive to differentiate a stationary series from one that is non-stationary, especially 
at the level.  
In order to evaluate the unit root property more structurally for each variable 
at its level, we apply the next set of tests introduced by Banerjee, Lumsdaine and 
Stock (1992) ---henceforth BLS. The BLS test provides a more in-depth investigation 
of the possibility that aggregate economic time series can be characterised as being 
stationary around “ a single or multiple structural breaks”. The BLS test extends the 
Dickey-Fuller t-test by constructing the time series of rollingly computed estimators  
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and their t-statistics. Following the BLS, we can compute the smallest (minimal) and 
the largest (maximal) Dickey-Fuller t-test statistics from the rolling test, both of which 
are compared to their respective critical values (Table 2B). The test results confirm 
the findings of the ADF tests. It also finds that the null hypothesis of non-stationary at 
the 5 percent critical value cannot be rejected for  it G L r r ) ( − of the private bank at the 
level. Overall, we can therefore conclude that all variables are integrated of order 1. 
 
  4.2.2 The Long-Run Determinants of Small Enterprise Loans 
  Given the unit-root properties of the relevant series, the presence of a long-
run relationship among the variables in Equation 7 for each group (total, state and 
private) will have to be evaluated. For each testing, the time trend variable is added 
into the regression equation. If the variable is found to be insignificant, then it will be 
excluded from the final testing. The Johansen Cointegration test results are reported 
in (Tables 3 - 5). 
  In all three cases, we find one cointegrating relationship at 1 percent 
significant level for both the “total” regression and the state bank; and at 5 percent 
level for both regressions of the private bank. Due to their significant Chi-square 
statistics  )) 1 ( (
2 χ  at 1 percent, the time trend  ) (t is included only for the state bank 
case. As for the “total” and “the private bank” regressions, the time trend variable is 
insignificant, hence it is dropped from the final testing. In all three regressions, the 
crisis dummy variable is excluded due to its insignificant  )) 1 ( (
2 χ statistics. The signs 
of the coefficient estimates of all key variables for both groups of banks are 
consistent with the theoretical framework, with the exception of the  it D L r r ) ( − for the 
state bank regression (Table 4).  
The results also suggest that the long-run coefficient estimate for the spread 
rates between the loan and the SBI are significant at 1 percent level of  ) 1 (
2 χ  for both  
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the private and state bank individually, and at 5 percent for the total regression. As 
for the spread rates between the loan and deposit, the coefficients are significant at 1 
percent level for the state, but only at 5 percent for the private bank and at 10 percent 
for the “total” case.     
Conflicting results are reported from the cointegration testing on the “policy 
requirement”  ) ( t gg variable. For the total regression, this variable is found to be 
theoretically consistent and significant in explaining the long-run supply of the loans 
to the small enterprises at 1 percent level (Table 3).  When we regress the individual 
group of banks, the variable  ) ( t gg  is found to be insignificant for the state banks, but 
it is significant at 5 percent level of  ) 1 (
2 χ statistics for the private banks (Tables 4 – 
5).   
   
  4.2.3 The Autoregressive Distributed Lag Error Correction Model 
  Next, the ARDL Error Correction Model testing is conducted to analyse the 
short-run determinants of the supply of small enterprise loans for all three cases. This 
approach is adopted to allow us to evaluate not only the significance of the 
determinant factors, but equally important, the “timing” of the impacts. We follow the 
general to specific approach of Hendry (1974 and 1977) by starting with four lags and 
dropping the insignificant lags.
23 The ARDL error correction model can be expressed 
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We add the lags of the dependent variable  ) ( ) (
s
k t i PL − ∆ to capture the impacts of the 
previous quarters of loans ---the adjustment component. The coefficient estimate for 
                                                 
23    Given the number of observations and the degree of freedom, we only include four lags. 
As the test results show that at most only up to three lags are found to be significant for both 
sets of regression estimates (Table 5 and 6).    
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this lagged dependent variable is expected to be negative, as a substantial growth in 
the supply of loans at (t-1) will likely to be followed by a lesser amount at time (t). As 
for the rest of the explanatory variables, the coefficient estimates are expected to be 
consistent with the theoretical frameworks discussed in section 3. The error 
correction component ( 1 − t ecm ) represents a long-run relationship, and is expected to 

























ϕ δ β ,  0 < γ , and  . 0 < λ   
 
  Confirming the fundamental role of the key explanatory variables, Tables (6 – 
8) report significant and theoretically consistent coefficient estimates for the lending 
and the SBI spread rate variable and  ) ( t gg  at 1 percent to 10 percent critical levels. 
The coefficient estimate for  ) (gg  is significant at time  ) (t  and at  ) 2 ( − t for the case 
of private and state banks, respectively. As for the spread between the lending rate 
and deposit rate, the coefficients are all significant at either 1 percent or 5 percent, 
but coefficients for the total loans (Table 6) and the state bank (Table 7) are negative, 
inconsistent with the prior theoretical expectation.  
The significance and negative coefficients  ) (λ  for all three regressions 
confirm the presence of a long-run relationship between the relevant variables. The 
sizes of the coefficient indicate that the convergence to the long-run trend is more 
rapid in the case of the private national banks than that of the state banks. For the 
lagged variable of loan outstanding  ) ( ) (
s
k t i PL − ∆  and the crisis dummy, we find a  
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significant case only for the private national banks and for the state bank, 
respectively.
24   
Several key diagnostic statistics, including the Durbin-Watson (DW), the 
Ljung-Box Q statistics, the adjusted R-squared, the F-statistics (and its probability), 
the Engle’s ARCH test for heteroscedasticity and the Jarque-Bera normality test, are 
presented for each regression. The adjusted R-squared suggests that the changes in 
the independent variables explained at least around 65 percent of the fluctuations in 
the small loans, arguably a respectably high R-squared for a short-run analysis. 
Similarly, the F-statistics indicate that the probability is at least 95 percent that one or 
more of the independent variables are non-zero. The Durbin-Watson statistics and 
the Q-statistics indicate that the serial correlations are not a problem in any of the 
regression results. The ARCH results conclude the absence of heteroscedasticity in 
general. Lastly, the Jarque-Bera test statistics confirm the normality of the 
disturbances. 
 
4.2.3.1 Testing the Implicit Assumption of Exogeneity  
The validity of the econometrics test results posted in tables (6 - 8) crucially 
depends on the implicit assumption that the right-hand side variables in Equation (10) 
are statistically exogenous to supply of credits for each of the groups of banks. To 
test for the statistical exogeneity, we employ the one-sided procedure to test for 
causality in the sense of Granger (1969). This one-sided Granger causality test is 
chosen here from a number of alternative causality techniques in the light of the 
Monte Carlo evidence reported by Geweke, Meese, and Dent (1983).
25   
To be consistent with the ARDL error-correction model tests, we consider 
only the significant variables posted in Tables 6 - 8. Furthermore, since the Granger 
                                                 
24    When we include  ) ( ) (
s
k t i PL − ∆  for the state bank regression, the overall results of the test 
actually worsened. So we opted not to include this variable, and only focused on the primary 
explanatory variables. 
25    The same procedure was also employed by Darrat and Arize (1990).  
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test is narrowly interpreted here as a test for statistical exogeneity of particular 
variables within a given model, it seemed more prudent to maintain the same lag 
specifications as in the early results shown in Tables 6 - 8 when applying the 
Granger test.
26  From the test results, we can conclude that the implicit assumption of 
exogeneity for the explanatory variables is generally found to be applicable in all 
cases. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the test results. But the results can 
be made available upon request.   
 
5. Policy  Implications 
5.1  The Loan and SBI Spread Rates 
  Given high uncertainties facing the local industries, especially at the peak of 
the crisis in 1998 and 1999, the availability of the Certificate of Bank Indonesia, a 
relatively secure investment instrument with respectably high interest returns has 
attracted banks to accumulate a rather generous proportion of their assets in terms of 
the SBI. In 1999, the ratio of outstanding SBI to total bank credit reached well above 
40 percent (Bank Indonesia (2000)).  The database of Bank Indonesia also shows 
that by the end of November 2002, around 23 percent and 45 percent of the 
outstanding SBI in the domestic economy are being held by the state and the private 
commercial banks, respectively. The large holding of central bank certificate confirms 
the presence of a flight to quality, shifting assets toward less risky ones (Ding, 
Domac and Ferri (1998) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996). 
The positive coefficient estimate for variable  t G L r r ) ( − in all three regressions 
suggests that the high holding of SBI, particularly by the private commercial banks, 
reduces the pool of loans to local industries, including those for the small businesses. 
These findings underscore the adverse consequence of the tight monetary policy 
                                                 





adopted by the central bank on the supply of credits to the small enterprises at the 
early stage of the crisis in particular. They also confirm the findings of early studies 
on these issues such as Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Mankiw (1996), Kashyap, 
Stein and Wilcox (1993) and Bank Indonesia (2000).  
 
5.2  The Loan and Deposit Spread Rates  
The positive and significant coefficient estimate for  t D L r r ) ( −  for private 
banks suggests the undesirable consequences of the much sharper increase in the 
rates of the deposit than those of the lending rates on the levels and shares of the 
small business lending (Table 8). Our test results support the claims of Cameron 
(1999) and Siregar (2004).
27  
However, for the state bank, the coefficient for  t D L r r ) ( −  is found to be 
significant and negative (Table 7). Given the share of the state bank loans to small 
enterprise in average larger than that of the private bank, the coefficient for the 
spread between lending and deposit is also significant and negative for the “total” 
case (Table 6).  
The finding for the state bank is theoretically inconsistent, and more 
importantly, it suggests that the state banks in Indonesia do not necessarily behave 
like a profit-maximizing banks. After experiencing a sharp drop at the early stage of 
the crisis (the last two quarters of 1997 and first quarter of 1998), the share of the 
small business loans of the state banks immediately grew positively (Figure 2). This 
was despite the much more severe and lasting negative spreads between the loan 
and deposit rates experienced by the state bank than those reported for the private 
banks (Figure 5).  
                                                 
27    These two studies, particularly Cameron (1999), do not provide much of empirical testing 




Arguably given the full supports of the government and the increase of public 
deposits in the state banks, particularly at the early stage of 1997 financial crisis, the 
state banks were able to endure the heavy cost of the negative spreads and became 
the main source of loans to the domestic industries in general, and to the small 
businesses in particular. Even with the central bank guarantee on all deposits of the 
commercial banks (private and state), savers appeared to want to avoid the 
potentially long delayed on the withdrawals of the savings when a private bank was 
being restructured (Patten et.al (2001)).  This explains the massive transfer of 
deposits from the private to the state banks, especially at the height of the crisis.
 28 
As shown in Figures 2, the share of the small enterprise credits by the private 
bank, on the other hand, did not report any positive growths until early 1999 when the 
spread rates have returned to positive levels. By end of December 1997, the total 
outstanding credits extended by the private bank in Indonesia was about 169 trillion 
rupiah compared to around 132 trillion rupiah of the state bank. At the end of 
December 1999, the outstanding loans of the private bank dropped severely to 
around 56 trillion rupiah, while the number of the state bank dropped at a much less 
significant rate to around 112 trillion rupiah. 
29   
                                                 
28    With the closures of key private banks, leading to bank run on the private banks at the 
early stage of the crisis, and under the wide perception that the state banks would be 
protected by the government, a large share of bank deposits in the country moved from the 
private to the state banks. Patten et.al (2001) shows that total saving at the Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (a state bank) increased from 8.3 trillion rupiah at the end of October 1997 to 17.9 
trillion rupiah at the end of October 1999. The data on demand, saving and time deposits for 
different groups of bank can be downloaded from the web-site of Bank Indonesia 
(www.bi.go.id). 
29    Subsequently, the much sharper rise in the short-term deposit (such as one month rate) 
than the longer term (such as one year) had created a substantial and destabilising shift in the 
time deposits.
29 Between late 1996 to July 1997, the proportion of longer-term deposits (6 
month or 12 months) in the domestic banking sector was around 45-50 percent of the total 
time deposit, with one-month deposits constituting less than 30 percent (Evans (1998)). By 
July 1998, the share of one-month deposit reached almost 70 percent of the total deposit, 
while the 6 and 12 month deposits dropped to less than 15 percent. The dominance of very 
short-term deposits add further element of instability to bank operations, through mismatch 
between short-term funds and long-term loans. This unfavourable position largely contributes 
to the worsening of the level of non-performance loans and negative profits experienced by 
the domestic banking industry in 1998 and 1999 (Siregar (2003)). Overall, the banking 
industry in Indonesia had experienced a total gross loss of as much as Rp178 trillion by 
December 1998. Coincide with the end of negative spread rates in early 2000, the banking 
industry started to post positive gross profits in 2000 and 2001. Reflecting the improvement in  
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5.3  Bank Indonesia Policy of January 2001   
Based on the significant and positive coefficient estimate of variable  t gg  of 
the Johansen test for the private bank, the central bank policy of January 2001 will 
likely to have long-run unfavourable consequences on the share of the outstanding 
credits to small enterprises by the national private banks, but not for the state banks 
(Table 3 and 5). Furthermore, the adverse long-run implication of the abolishment of 
any mandatory credit allocation to the small enterprises by the private banks seems 
to have generated the unfavourable consequence of the January 2001 policy on the 
“total” credit outstanding extended by the state and the private banks combined 
(Table 3).  We recognize however the results for the long-run cases may not be 
robust due to the available short sample period. 
Another interesting analyses can be drawn from the short-run flows. The 
coefficient estimate of variable (gg ) of Table 7 suggests that the abolishment of the 
mandatory credit allocation policy did not have an immediate impact on the supply of 
small enterprise loans by the state banks. The test result indicates that there are six 
months (two quarters) lags. As for the private banks, an immediate implication is 
reported, with none of the lagged variable (gg ) is found to be significant. The less 
severe impacts of the abolishment of credit mandatory allocation policy to small 
enterprise on the state banks than on the private banks can be attributed to the roles 
of two state banks (BRI and BTN) and also the indirect supports by the central bank 
to those two state banks.  
The empirical findings for the short-run cases are consistent with the stylised 
facts. The percentage share of credit outstanding to the small businesses by the 
private banks started to fall in the first quarter of 2001, while those of the state bank 
                                                                                                                                            
the profitability of the banking industry, the percentage of the gross non-performing loans over 
the total loans of the group of private national banks under the Indonesian Bank Restructuring 
Agency improved to the level of 18 percent at the end of 2000 from the worst level of 50 




only reported substantial declines starting the third quarter of 2001 (Figure 2).   By 
the end of the third quarter of 2001, the average share of the loan outstanding to 
small businesses by the private banks has dropped to around 12 percent, while that 
of the state bank still hovered around 27 percent, significantly higher than the 
abolished 20 percent requirement.    
  Our overall test results in general, and for the private sector in particular, 
validates the concerns shared by the parliament members on the need to reintroduce 
the mandatory loan requirement for the small enterprises. In fact, the parliamentary 
debates in late 2002 and early 2003 had even brought up the possibility of 40 percent 
allocation of commercial bank loans to the small - and medium-scale enterprises.
30   
 
6.  Future Challenges and Concluding Remarks 
This study introduces a profit-maximization model that captures three primary 
determinants of the supply of bank loans to the small enterprises by the private and 
the state banks in Indonesia. The empirics confirmed the consequences of negative 
spreads of key interest rate spreads on the supply of the small enterprise loans. With 
the more moderate monetary policy stance starting late 1999, these key interest 
spreads have returned to positive numbers.  
The test results also suggest that the abolishment of the mandatory credit 
allocation has been responsible for the decline in the share of small enterprise loans 
by the private and state since first quarter 2001. Debates have emerged on this 
issue, both in parliament and various ministries. Should Indonesia reinstate the policy 
of mandatory credit allocation to small enterprises on all commercial banks (private 
and state)?  
Recent studies have stressed a number of adverse implications of 
government interventions, connected lending, and lack of prudential regulation and 
supervision on the performance of domestic banks and in explaining episodes of 
                                                 
30    BISNIS INDONESIA Daily Newspaper, November 15, 2002.  
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banking crisis in 1980s and 1990s (Goldstein and Turner (1996) and Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1997)). In particular, there is widespread agreement that 
government directed lending contributed to the banking sector problems such as 
distorition in credit allocation and pricing in Japan, Korea, Turkey, China and other 
countries over the past two decades.
31   
Furthermore, which institution should be responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the policy? With the lack of any other legitimate and independent 
authority to assume this role, Bank Indonesia seems to be the only natural 
candidate.
32 Despite, the transfer of responsibility from the central bank to BRI, BTN 
and a new institution to monitor and to ensure adequate supply of loans to the small 
and medium enterprises, the indirect role of Bank Indonesia remains arguably 
significant. Will this create hindrances to the on-going efforts of creating an 
independent central bank? From the past experiences of Bank Indonesia, the 
responsibility of administering credits for domestic industries in general have often 
clashed with the conduct and target of the monetary policy.  
To design appropriate measures to deal with the small business loans, further 
researches certainly have to be performed. Just looking at the present trends, it is 
clear however that the role of regional development banks should be enhanced. At 
the end of December 1997, the small business loans of the regional banks only 
contributed less than 7 percent of the total small loans by the banking sector. During 
the crisis, their share had steadily increased and reached around 20 percent by June 
2002, only few percentage points lower than the share of the private national banks. 
The local nature of small business lending requires local expertise for monitoring 
borrower-specific risks, etc., and hence, appears to suit the inherently more local 
                                                 
31   See for example: Borensztein and Lee (1999), Lindgren et.al (1999) and Huh and Kim 
(1993). 
32   Starting May 2003, there have been intensive discussions in the country on initiatives to 
create an independent institution that has the full responsibilities of monitoring the operations 
of the domestic financial institutions. Most agree that there is a need for this type of institution. 
But many also acknowledge that the establishment of this type of institution will require a 
good number of years.  
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focus of the regional development bank. Furthermore, as private banks get larger 
through mergers and consolidations, their business focus is expected to shift toward 
larger commercial customers.
 33  The commitment by the local and central 
governments in Indonesia to push for the decentralization process, through 
delegations of much larger autonomies from the central government to the provincial 
government, should largely shape the role of the regional development banks as a 
provider of financial services to the local industries in each province, including the 
small businesses in the near future.
34 
                                                 
23   The ongoing consolidation of the banking industry in the United States for instance has 
shown evidences that as banking organizations grow in size; the needs of smaller business 
customers may not be met (Peek and Rosengren (1996), Samolyk (1997), Strahan and 
Wetson (1998), and Avery and Samolyk (2000). Berger et.al (1998) find that small business 
lending increases following small bank mergers but falls following large bank mergers.  
34   In general the implementation of regional autonomy is regulated by Law No. 22, 1999 on 
“Local Government” and Law No. 25, 1999 on “The Fiscal Balance Between the Central 
Government and the Regions”. The initial stage of the implementation of the regional 
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Table 1:  













































       
 









































       
 










































Source: Database of Bank Indonesia 
 
Note: 
1/ For instance; Share for small scale firms=(total gross output of small firms/total GDP)*100% 
 
2/ For instance; Share for small scale firms=(total small scale entrepreneurs/total entrepreneurs)*100% 
 
3/ For instance;  





Table 2:  
ADF Unit-Root Test 
 
Variable  Statistics  # of Lags
a  Remarks 
    
Private Bank:     
-1.8532  4 (with intercept)  s
it L  
-4.1157 3  (none)
b 
I(1) 
-2.9069 1  (none) 
it D L r r ) ( −  
-5.1788 1  (none) 
I(1) 
it G L r r ) ( −   -2.7842 1  (none)  I(0) 
    
State Bank:     
-2.6717  1 (with intercept)  s
it L  
-3.2016 1  (none) 
I(1) 
-1.8379 1  (none) 
it D L r r ) ( −  
-3.3802 1  (none) 
I(1) 
-2.4058 1  (none) 
it G L r r ) ( −  
-3.6070 1  (none) 
I(1) 
     
Total:     
-2.4093  1 (with intercept)  s
it L  
-3.5220 1  (none) 
I(1) 
-2.8706 1  (none) 
it D L r r ) ( −  
-3.5461 1  (none) 
I(1) 
-2.9135 1  (none) 
it G L r r ) ( −  
-4.7143 1  (none) 
I(1) 
a/ The number of lags is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion statistics. 
b/None: 
without both intercept and time trend. 
 
 
Table 2b:  
BLS Rolling Unit-Root Test at the Level* 
 





























































* At the first difference, these variables are all stationary. Hence we can conclude, all of them 
are I(1) series. The results for the first difference cab be made available upon request to the 
author. Number of lags included here are consistent with the size that we use for the ADF. 




Johansen Cointegration Test for Total Outstanding Credits (Private and State) 
 




































At most 3 
(* ) indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 1% significance level. 
 
# of lags = 2; Log Likelihood = -96.00 
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 
                     (15.28)*     (3.52)***            (3.92)**                                               ) 1 (
2 χ  
 




Johansen Cointegration Test for the State Banks 
 




































At most 3 
(* ) indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 1% significance level. 
 
# of lags = 1, Log Likelihood = -127.23 
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 
                    (10.75)*             (19.99)*             (0.024)      (13.44)*                    ) 1 (
2 χ        
 
*significant at 1 percent ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 10 percent. 
 
t gg r r r r L t t G L t D L
s
t 011 . 0 017 . 0 ) ( 093 . 0 ) ( 082 . 0 813 . 2 + + − + − − =
t G L t D L t
s
t r r r r gg L ) ( 009 . 0 ) ( 015 . 0 172 . 0 981 . 2 − + − + + = t G L t D L t
s




Johansen Cointegration Test for the Private National Banks 
 




































At most 3 
(* ) indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% significance level. 
 
# of lags = 3; Log likelihood: -34.64  
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients: 
        (3.54)**             (47.97)*               (6.30)**                                                   ) 1 (
2 χ  
 





ARDL Error Correction Test for Total Credit Outstanding (State and Private) 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆ Lt 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistics  Probability 
 
2 − ∆ t gg  
 
0.0935 0.0481  1.9421 0.0623 
 
0.0138 0.0049  2.7976 0.0092 
 
-0.0232 0.0068 -3.4123 0.0020 
 
0.0126 0.0021  5.8483 0.0000 
 
0.0127 0.0029  4.3832 0.0001 
1 − t ECM   -0.3244 0.1360 -2.3845 0.0241 
 
Total Number of Observations: 38 
Adjusted R-squared:  0.693 
Durbin-Watson Stat:  1.927; Prob(Q(1))=0.978; Prob(Q(2))=0.952; 
Prob(Q(4))=0.0.992   ARCH(Prob(LM)): 0.884; F-stat:  13.808; Prob (F-stat):  0.0000; 
Prob(JB) = 0.101 
 
∆ () rr LD t −
1 ) ( − − ∆ t D L r r
t G L r r ) ( − ∆
381 . 2 250 . 0 ) ( 085 . 0 ) ( 073 . 0 + + − + − = t t G L t D L
s
t gg r r r r L




ARDL Error Correction Test for The State Banks 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆ Lt 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistics  Probability 
 
 
-0.0301 0.0057 -5.3221 0.0000 
 
0.0174 0.0022  7.8591 0.0000 
 
0.0096 0.0023  4.1240 0.0003 
2 ) ( − ∆ t gg  
 
0.1365 0.0474  2.8772 0.0077 
1 − t ECM   -0.2197 0.0398 -5.1557 0.0000 
 
t Dummy  
 
-0.4422 0.0954 -4.6365 0.0001 
Total Number of Observations: 38 
Adjusted R-squared:  0.661 
Durbin-Watson Stat:  2.436; Prob(Q(1))=0.068; Prob(Q(2))=0.161; Prob(Q(4))=0.300   





ARDL Error Correction Test for the Private National Banks 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆ Lt 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistics  Probability 
 
 
-0.6609 0.1188 -5.5613 0.0000 
 
0.0176 0.0083  2.1154 0.0431 
 
0.0312 0.0036  8.7922 0.0000 
 
0.1173 0.0531  2.2077 0.0353 
 
-0.2276 0.0430 -5.642  0.0000 
Total Number of Observations: 38 
Adjusted R-squared:  0.698 
Durbin-Watson Stat:  1.861; Prob(Q(1))=0.742; Prob(Q(2))=0.422; Prob(Q(4))=0.132;   
ARCH(Prob(LM)): 0.150; F-stat:  16.729; Prob (F-stat):  0.0000; Prob(JB): 0.726 
  
∆ Lt− 1
∆ () rr LD t − − 2
∆ () rr LG t −
t gg) ( ∆
ECMt− 1
1 ) ( − − ∆ t D L r r
t G L r r ) ( − ∆




Growth Rate of Nominal Loans (Small and Total)  













Growth Rate of Real Loans (Small and Total)  











Source: Bank Indonesia database and author’s own calculation. The real loans are 






































“Total “ captures the share of the small business loans out of total private and state 
outstanding loans. 
 







Figure 4:  
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Source: Database of Bank Indonesia.  
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